A Market for Immigration by Israelsen, Karl E. et al.
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
Economic Research Institute Study Papers Economics and Finance 
2006 
A Market for Immigration 
Karl E. Israelsen 
L. Dwight Israelsen 
Utah State University 
William J. Israelsen 
Utah State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri 
Recommended Citation 
Israelsen, Karl E.; Israelsen, L. Dwight; and Israelsen, William J., "A Market for Immigration" (2006). 
Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 317. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri/317 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Economics and Finance at DigitalCommons@USU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Economic Research 
Institute Study Papers by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please 
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu. 
Economic Research Institute Study Paper 
ERI #2006-04 
A Market for Immigration 
by 
Karl E. Israelsen 
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P .C. 
L. Dwight Israelsen 
Department of Economics 
Utah State University 
3530 Old Main Hill 
Logan, UT _84322-3530 
William J. Israelsen 
Utah State University 
A Market for Immigration 
Karl E. Israelsen 
L. Dwight Israelsen 
William J. Israelsen 
Department of Economics 
Utah State University 
3530 Old Main Hill 
Logan, UT 84322-3530 
The analyses and views reported in this paper are those of the author(s). They are not 
necessarily endorsed by the Department of Economics or by Utah State University. 
Utah State University is committed to the policy that all persons shall have equal access to its 
prograrns and employment without regard to race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, 
age, marital status, disability, public assistance status, veteran status, or sexual orientation. 
Information on other titles in this series may be obtained from: Department of Economics, 
Utah State University, 3530 Old Main Hill, Logan, UT 84322-3530. 
Copyright © 2006 by Karl E. Israelsen, L. Dwight Israelsen, and William J. Israelsen, 
All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for noncommercial 
purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
A Market for Immigration 
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ABSTRACT 
Illegal immigration imposes large economic costs on U.s. taxpayers. The costs 
are disproportionately concentrated on citizens of southern border states and of other 
states in which illegal immigrants concentrate. The illegal immigrants themselves also 
suffer significant costs of migration, such as monetary payments for transportation to or 
across the border and physical costs, including death. These costs, as well as the benefits 
to the economy of the illegal immigrant labor force, have been the subject of heated 
political debate, and polls show that Us. citizens place the issue of immigration at or 
near the top of the list of domestic problems that must be addressed. The issue of illegal 
immigration, particularly from Mexico, is doubly important, in that it is also perceived as 
a national security problem. Dealing with illegal immigration is a thorny political 
problem, since both political parties seek to curry favor with the Hispanic population, 
which is now the largest Us. minority community. Hence, Congress has been reluctant 
to take drastic action to strengthen border security or to enforce immigration law on 
illegal immigrants already in the United States unless they commit felonies. This study 
looks at the impacts on the United States and on potential immigrants of a legal market 
for immigration into the U. S. The current immigration laws and regulations are 
summarized, and rules for an immigration market are identified. The basic provision of a 
market for immigration would allow individuals who qualified for immigration to the 
United States under current laws and quotas, and who had been awarded legal 
immigrant status, to sell their right to immigrate to others who could qualify under the 
law, but who had not completed the process to obtain legal immigrant status. The effects 
of those structures and rules on legal and illegal immigration are analyzed in the context 
of economic efficiency and equity. Estimates of the impact of a market for immigration 
on costs and benefits of immigration, including illegal immigration, are provided, and 
policy recommendations are identified. 
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Illegal immigration imposes large economic costs on u.s. taxpayers. The costs are disproportionately 
concentrated on citizens of southern border states and of other states in which illegal immigrants 
concentrate. The illegal immigrants themselves also suffer significant costs of migration, such as 
monetary payments for transportation to or across the border and physical costs, including death. 
These costs, as well as the benefits to the economy of the illegal immigrant labor force, have been the 
subject of heated political debate, and polls show that u.s. citizens place the issue of immigration at 
or near the top of the list of domestic problems that must be addressed. The issue of illegal 
immigration, particularly from Mexico, is doubly important, in that it is also perceived as a national 
security problem. Dealing with illegal immigration is a thorny political problem, since both political 
parties seek to curry favor with the Hispanic population, which is now the largest u.s. minority 
community. Hence, Congress has been reluctant to take drastic action to strengthen border security 
or to enforce immigration law on illegal immigrants already in the United States unless they commit 
felonies. This study looks at the impacts on the United States and on potential immigrants of a legal 
market for immigration into the u.s. The current immigration laws and regulations are summarized, 
and rules for an immigration market are identified. The basic provision of a market for immigration 
would allow individuals who qualified for immigration to the United States under current laws and 
quotas, and who had been awarded legal immigrant status, to sell their right to immigrate to others 
who could qualify under the law, but who had not completed the process to obtain legal immigrant 
status. The effects of those structures and rules on legal and illegal immigration are analyzed in the 
context of economic efficiency and equity. Estimates of the impact of a market for immigration on 
costs and benefits of immigration, including illegal immigration, are provided, and policy 
recommendations are identified. 
I. Introduction 
Illegal immigration imposes large economic costs on U.S. taxpayers. The costs are 
disproportionately concentrated on citizens of southern border states and of other states in which 
illegal immigrants concentrate. The illegal immigrants themselves also suffer significant costs of 
migration, such as monetary payments for transportation to or across the border and physical costs, 
including death. These costs, as well as the benefits to the economy of the illegal immigrant labor 
force, have been the subject of heated political debate, and polls show that U.S. citizens place the issue 
of immigration at or near the top of the list of domestic problems that must be addressed. The issue of 
illegal immigration, particularly from Mexico, is doubly important in that it is also perceived as a 
national security problem. Dealing with illegal immigration is a thorny political problem, since both 
political parties seek to curry favor with the Hispanic population, which is now the largest U.S. 
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minority community. Hence, Congress has been reluctant to take drastic action to strengthen border 
security or to enforce immigration law on illegal immigrants already in the United States unless they 
commit felonies. 
This study looks at the impacts on the United States and on potential immigrants of a legal 
market for immigration into the U.S. The current immigration laws and regulations are summarized, 
and rules for an immigration market are identified. The basic provision of a market for immigration 
would allow individuals who qualified for immigration to the United States under current laws and 
quotas, and who had been awarded legal immigrant status, to sell their right to immigrate to others who 
could qualify under the law, but who had not completed the process to obtain legal immigrant status. 
The effects of those structures and rules on legal and illegal immigration are analyzed in the context 
of economic efficiency and equity. Estimates of the impact of a market for immigration on costs and 
benefits of immigration, including illegal immigration, are provided, and policy recommendations are 
identified. 
II. Immigration Law 
Federal immigration laws are a complex and confusing web of rules, regulations, quotas, 
designations and classifications. Nevertheless, underpinning this complexity is a relatively 
straightforward framework. Below is a brief summary of this framework, and includes an overview of 
immigration law, refugee and asylee law, naturalization, and the history of U.S. immigration law 
(including naturalization and refugee law). This summary is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely 
an overview for purposes of this paper. 
Immigration 
Under U.S. law an immigrant is a foreign-born individual who has been admitted to reside 
permanently in the United States as a "Lawful Permanent Resident" or "LPR." A foreign-born 
individual may become an LPR in one of three ways: 1) family-sponsored immigration, 2) 
employment-based immigration, or 3) diversity visa lottery. Below is a brief description of each 
method. l 
F amity-Sponsored Immigration 
Family-sponsored immigration allows U.S. citizens and LPRs to bring family members from 
other countries to live permanently in the United States. Citizens may sponsor their spouses, children, 
parents (if the citizen is over 21), and siblings (if the citizen is over 21). LPRs may sponsor their 
spouses and unmarried children. Approximately 75% of regular immigration to the United States is 
accomplished through family-sponsored immigration.2 
1 Immigration Basics 2005, National Immigration Forum (2005). 
21d. 
-2-
Current U.S. immigration laws places family members in one of two tiers. The first is limited 
to "immediate relatives" of U.S. citizens. These include spouses, parents and unmarried minor 
children. Immigrant visas for this category are not capped and have equaled approximately 350,000 in 
recent years. The second tier includes all other "family sponsorship" immigrants. These individuals 
fall into the "family preference system," which categorizes the relationship between the immigrant and 
the sponsoring family member into a "preference." Each preference is allotted a certain number of 
visas, with the entire family preference system capped at 226,000 visas per year in the recent past. 
Family-sponsored immigration is capped at aggregate 480,000 visas; however, this cap may be 
exceeded due primarily to the absence of a cap on "immediate relatives." When more applications for 
visas are filed for a preference category than are available, the preference is oversubscribed. As of 
2005, all visa preference categories are oversubscribed. For example, due to oversubscription, the 
spouse or a minor child of an LPR must wait more than four years to obtain a permanent immigrant 
visa. Depending on the individual's home country, a sibling of a U.S. citizen can expect to wait 
anywhere from 12 to 22 years at a minimum. Generally an "oversubscriber" is not allowed a visitor's 
visa due to the risk that the individual will not leave the United States upon expiration of the visa.3 
Employment-Based Immigration 
Employment-based immigration permits immigrants with certain skills and talents needed in 
the United States to immigrate in order to work there. Current immigration law allocates 140,000 
visas for employment-based immigration each year.4 
In order to obtain an employment-based visa, an employer of the immigrant usually must 
petition the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services for that individual. However, priority 
workers, investors and certain other immigrants may petition on their own behalf. U.S. immigration 
law divides employment-based visas into five preferences. "First preference" visas are issued to 
"priority workers," who are roughly defined as "outstanding professors and researchers" and "certain 
multinational executives and managers." This first preference visas comprise 28.6% (approximately 
40,000) of the employment-based visas. "Second preference" visas are issued to "members of 
professions holding advanced degrees or aliens of exceptional ability." As with first preference visas, 
second preference visas comprise 28.6% of total employment-based visas as well as any unused first 
preference visas. "Third preference" visas are issued to "skilled workers, professionals, and other 
workers." "Other workers" excludes unskilled labor and seasonal or temporary workers and is 
allocated 5,000 visas. Skilled workers must be capable of performing skilled labor requiring at least 
two years training or experience. Third preference visas comprise 28.6% of the total employment 
based visas plus any remaining first or second preference visas. "Fourth preference" visas are issued to 
"special immigrants." These include religious workers and ministers. This preference comprises 7.1 % 
of the total (approximately 1 0,000). "Fifth preference" visas are reserved for persons who will invest 
between $500,000 and $3,000,000 (depending on the area of the country) in a job-creating enterprise. 
U.S. law requires that each such investor employs at least ten U.S. workers. Fifth preference visas 




Second and third preference workers must, among other things, obtain a certificate from the 
United States indicating that the United States has insufficient workers who are willing, qualified and 
able to do the work of the immigrant. In addition, the Labor Department must confirm that his 
presence will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers. 
In addition to the above permanent visas, the United States issues temporary visas to certain 
non-immigrant "highly skilled" workers, certain graduates of U.S. universities, temporary, and 
seasonal agricultural workers. In 2005, the cap on such visas is approximately 150,000. 
Because only 5,000 permanent visas are issued to workers who don't require high skills, and 
because of the high demand for unskilled labor in the United States, the demand for undocumented 
workers is particularly high. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services anticipates that the 66,000 
temporary visas allocated for seasonal or temporary workers will be depleted within the first 6 months 
of fiscal 2005. Interestingly, the cap for temporary visas for skilled workers was reached the first day 
of fiscal 2005. Congress since allocated an additional 20,000 visas to such workers. 
Diversity Lottery 
In 1990, Congress established an annual "diversity" lottery program to set aside a certain 
number of visas for people from countries that send relatively few immigrants to the U.S. This was 
instituted in an effort to prevent all the visas from being awarded to only a handful of countries. 
Winners of this diversity lottery are granted permanent residence without needing to qualify for 
family-based or employment-based immigration. The State Department designates eligible countries. 
Citizens of only those countries may enter the lottery. The State Department has designated citizens 
of all countries eligible to enter except for the 16 countries sending the most immigrants in the past five 
years. Those 16 countries are Canada, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, 
India, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, South Korea, United Kingdom (except 
Northern Ireland) and Vietnam. Participants in the lottery must have a high school equivalent 
education or, within the previous five year, have two years work experience in an occupation that 
requires at least two years of training or experience. Diversity visas currently are capped at 50,000.5 
Refugees and AsyJees 
Refugees and asylees have the commonality of seeking protection in the United States. The 
only substantive difference between the two is the place of application. Refugees apply while outside 
the United States, whereas asylees apply while inside the United States. 
If awarded refugee status, the refugee is sent to the United States and is given assistance 
through the "refugee resettlement program." The number of refugees is capped in 2005 at 50,000. This 
quota is allocated among Africa (20,000), Europe/Central Asia (9,500), East Asia (13,000), Near 
East/South Asia (2,500) and Latin America/Caribbean (5,000). In addition to this 50,000, the United 
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States has set an unallocated reserve for up to 20,000 refugees. The United States grants asylee status 
to up to 10,000 persons each year. Obtaining refugee or asylee status provides that individual with 
pennanent residency in the United States. 
In order to obtain refugee or asylee status, one must, among other things, have a "well-founded 
fear of persecution" in his homeland based on race, religion, membership in a social group, political 
opinion or national origin. 6 
Benefits to Immigrants 
The United States offers certain benefits to immigrants depending on, among other things, their 
immigrant status, when they entered the United States, their work history, their income, their length of 
residence, their age, their state of residence. Generally speaking, most benefits programs are open only 
to long-tenn, lawful immigrants. However, some programs such as school lunch and emergency 
medical services are open to all. Undocumented immigrants or illegal aliens are not eligible for nearly 
all federal benefits. The benefits different states give such undocumented immigrants and illegal 
aliens vary.7 
Naturalization 
Naturalization is the process by which eligible legal immigrants become U.S. Citizens.8 As 
indicated below, U.S. laws place several restrictions on who may become a naturalized citizen. 
Generally speaking, immigrants must be 18 year of age and have resided at least five continuous years 
in the United States, though the time frame may be shortened in certain circumstances. Immigrants 
must have "good moral character" and, with certain exceptions, an ability to speak, read, and write 
ordinary English. Generally, the immigrant must have a basic understanding of U.S. government and 
American history. 
Once an immigrant becomes a naturalized citizen of the United States, he may enjoy all the 
constitutional and statutory rights of other citizens. These include the right to vote, hold elected office 
(except the Presidency) and sit on a jury, hold certain government and private jobs requiring security 
clearance, travel abroad for unrestricted periods of time, and access restricted federal programs. 
History of U.S Immigration Law 
From its beginning, the United States, like any other country, has had to address the issue of 
citizenship. That is, it must decide who it will allow to enter and to remain within its borders and under 
what conditions it will do so. The first federal act addressing this issue, the Act of March 26, 1790, set 
at two years the minimum residency requirement necessary for naturalization.9 Aside from taking a 
6 1d. 
7 1d . 
B Id at 15. 
9 Naturalization Act of June 18, 1798 (1 Statutes-at-Large 566) 
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relatively simplistic approach, it reflected the reality that laws often reflect the then-current political, 
economic, social and cultural environment. In the late 1700s, the United States was a sparsely 
populated, agrarian nation. As the young government grew, it began to see a need for placing more 
formalities on obtaining the rights of citizenship. By 1798, the minimum residency period had grown 
to fourteen years, and rules regarding record-keeping of naturalization, formal declaration of intent to 
seek naturalization, reporting of aliens arriving by ship, and registration of resident aliens had been 
established. Io In that same year, Congress passed a bill permitting the President to arrest and deport 
any alien deemed dangerous to the United States,11 thus displaying the first immigration law to address 
issues of national security. By 1802, the United States had reduced the residency requirement to five 
years and added to the naturalization requirements the prerequisite that the alien possess good moral 
character and allegiance to the Constitution. 12 
Congress took its first steps toward nuanced complexity when, in 1824, it differentiated the 
rules for aliens entering the United States as minors and those entering as adults,13 and in 1855, it 
began distinguishing between temporary and permanent aliens. 14 
The 1862 law prohibiting the transportation of "coolies" on American vessels not only had the 
practical effect of hindering Chinese immigration, it also marked the first in a long string of laws aimed 
at excluding entire groups of people. IS By 1864, immigration had become a large enough issue that 
10 Naturalization Act of June 18, 1798 (1 Statutes-at-Large 566) (the residency requirement was reduced to five 
years four year later, where it has remained to the present); Aliens Act of June 25, 1798 (1 Statutes-at-Large 
570) 
11 Aliens Act of June 25,1798 
12 Naturalization Act of April 14, 1802 (2 Statutes-at-Large 153) 
13 Act of May 26, 1824 (4 Statutes-at-Large 36) (setting a two-year, rather than the general three-year, interval 
between declaration of intention and admission to citizenship). 
14 Passenger Act of March 3, 1855 (10 Statutes-at-Large 715) 
15 Act of February 19, 1862 (12 Statutes-at-Large 340). See also, Act of March 3, 1875 (18 Statutes-at-Large 
477) (barring criminals, prostitutes, "Orientals" without their consent, and prohibiting contracts providing "coolie" 
labor); Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882 (22 Statutes-at-Large 58) (made permanent by Act of April 27, 
1904 (33 Statutes-at-Large 428) and effectively repealed by Act of April 29, 1943 (57 Statutes-at-Large 70» 
(prohibiting, among other things, the naturalization of Chinese); Immigration Act of August 3, 1882 (22 
Statutes-at-Large 214) (barring persons likely to become a public charge); Immigration Act of March 3, 1891 (26 
Statutes-at-Large 1084) (persons suffering from certain contagious disease, felons, persons convicted of other 
crimes or misdemeanors, polygamists, and aliens assisted by others by payment of passage); Immigration Act 
of March 3, 1903 (32 Statutes-at-Large 1213) (anarchists, or persons who believe in, or advocate, the overthrow 
by force or violence the government of the United States, or of all government, or of all forms of law, or the 
assassination of public officials); Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906 (34 Statutes-at-Large 596) (making English 
a requirement for naturalization); Immigration Act of February 20, 1907 (34 Statutes-at-Large 898) (imbeciles, 
feeble-minded persons, persons with physical or mental defects which may affect their ability to earn a living, 
persons afflicted with tuberculosis, children unaccompanied by their parents, persons who admitted the 
commission of a crime involving moral turpitude, and women coming to the United States for immoral purposes, 
and those persons the President felt would be detrimental on U.S. labor conditions (aimed primarily at Japanese 
Laborers»; Immigration Act of February 5, 1917 (39 Statutes-at-Large 874) (excluding illiterate aliens and 
creating the "barred zone" (known as the Asia-Pacific triangle), natives of which were declared inadmissible); 
Act of March 4, 1929 (45 Statutes-at-Large 1551); Alien Registration Act of June 28, 1940 (54 Statutes-at-Large 
670) (membership in proscribed organizations and subversive classes of aliens); Act of May 25, 1948 (62 
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Congress established the position of "Commissioner of Immigration," appointed by the President to 
serve under the Secretary of State. 16 
The United States began to slowly move away from exclusion of certain types of people when 
it instituted the quota system in 1921. 17 The Quota Law of May 19, 1921 limited the number of aliens 
of any nationality entering the United States to three percent of the foreign-born persons of that 
nationality who lived in the United States in 1910. Approximately 350,000 such aliens were permitted 
to enter each year as quota immigrants, mostly from Northern and Western Europe. In addition, the 
Quota Law exempted from this limitation aliens who had resided continuously for at least one year 
immediately preceding their application in one of the independent countries of the Western 
Hemisphere, nonimmigrant aliens such as government officials and their households, aliens in transit 
through the United States, and temporary visitors for business and pleasure, and aliens whose 
immigration is regulated by immigration treaty, actors, artists, lecturers, singers, nurses, ministers, 
professors, aliens belonging to any recognized learned profession, and aliens employed as domestic 
servants. Three years later, this quota system was supplemented by the Immigration Act of May 26, 
1924, which, after 1929, provided that the annual quota for any country or nationality had the same 
relation to 150,000 as the number of inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920 having that 
national origin had to the total number of inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920. 
Preference quota status was established for: unmarried children under 21; parents; spouses of U.S. 
citizens aged 21 and over; and for quota immigrants aged 21 and over who are skilled in agriculture, 
together with their wives and dependent children under age 16. Nonquota status was accorded to 
wives and unmarried children under age 18 of U.S. citizens, natives of Western Hemisphere countries, 
with their families, nonimmigrants, and certain others. This national origins quota system governed 
U.S. immigration policy until 1952 when Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
"INA"). 18 
The INA is the basic body of U.S. immigration law today. The INA revised the national origins 
quota system of the Immigration Act of 1924 by changing the national origins quota formula: it set the 
annual quota for an area at one-sixth of one percent of the number of inhabitants in the continental 
United States in 1920 whose ancestry or national origin was attributable to that area. All countries 
were allowed a minimum quota of 100, with a ceiling of 2,000 on most natives of countries in the 
Asia-Pacific triangle, which broadly encompassed the Asian countries. In addition, the INA made all 
races eligible for naturalization, eliminated discrimination between sexes with respect to immigration, 
introduced a system of selected immigration by giving a quota preference to skilled aliens whose 
services are urgently needed in the United States and to relatives of U.S. citizens and aliens, placed a 
limit on the use of the governing country's quota by natives of colonies and dependent areas, and 
modified and added significantly to the existing classes of nonimmigrant admission. The INA has 
since been amended, at least in part, approximately 100 times, and a full description of the INA 
Statutes-at-Large 268) (anarchists and similar classes); Internal Security Act of September 22, 1950 (64 
Statutes-at-Large 987) (Present and former membership in the Communist party or any other totalitarian party) 
16 Act of July 4, 1864 (13 Statutes-at-Large 385) 
17 Quota Law of May 19, 1921 (42 Statutes-at-Large 5) 
18 Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952 (INA) (66 Statutes-at-Large 163) 
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together with its amendments is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the INA made several 
important changes that should be noted. In 1961, Congress liberalized the quota provisions of the INA, 
partly by eliminating the ceiling of2,000 on the Asia-Pacific Triangle and insuring a minimum quota 
to 100 newly independent nations. 19 In 1965, Congress abolished the national origins quota system, 
eliminating national origins, race or ancestry as a basis for immigration to the United States. 20 
However, Congress maintained the principle of numerical restriction, expanding limits to world 
coverage by limiting Eastern Hemisphere immigration to 170,000 and placing a ceiling of 120,000 on 
Western Hemisphere immigration for the first time. However, the Western Hemisphere remained not 
subject to some provisions applicable to the Eastern Hemisphere. Thirteen years later, in 1976, 
Congress applied the same 20,000 per-country limit to the Western Hemisphere as applied to the 
Eastern Hemisphere.21 Two years later, the separate ceilings for the Eastern and Western Hemisphere 
immigration were joined into one worldwide quota of290,000. This cap (exclusive of refugees) was 
lowered to 270,000 in 1980.22 Ten years later, it was raised to 675,000, consisting of 480,000 
family-sponsored immigrants, 140,000 employment-based immigrants and 55,000 "diversity" 
immigrants.23 
In 1948, the United States implemented its first law admitting persons fleeing persecution, by 
permitting up to 205,000 displaced persons to immigrate during the two-year period beginning July 1, 
1948.24 This amount was later increased to 415,744?S 
III. Current Immigration Information 
Legal and Illegal Immigration 
Table 1 provides an overview of recent legal immigration into the United States using 
information taken from the most recent edition of the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. These 
numbers and percentages correspond closely to the quotas previously given. Refugees and asylees 
make up the majority of the persons included in 'Other categories.' 
Table 1. Legal Immigrants 
Category 2001 2002 2003 
19 Act of September 26, 1961 (75 Statutes-at-Large 650) 
20 Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of October 3, 1965 (79 Statutes-at-Large 911) 
21 Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of October 20, 1976 (90 Statutes-at-Large 2703) 
22 Refugee Act of March 17, 1980 (94 Statutes-at-Large 102) 
23 Immigration Act of November 29, 1990 (104 Statutes-at-Large 4978) 
24 Displaced Persons Act of June 25, 1948 (62 Statutes-at-Large 1009) 
25 Act of June 16, 1950 (64 Statutes-at-Large 219) 
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Total 1,064,318 1,063,732 705,827 
F amil y-sponsored immigrants 676,107 (63.5%) 673,817 (63.3%) 492,297 (69.7%) 
Employment-based preferences 179,195 (16.8%) 174,968 (16.4%) 82,137 (1l.6%) 
Diversity program 42,015 (3.9%) 42,829 (4.0%) 46,347 (6.6%) 
Other categories 166,964 (15.7%) 172,061 (16.2%) 85,025 (12.07%) 
Source: compiled from Table A, page 7, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics, 2003, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 2004 
Although illegal immigration into the United States has existed from the very beginning of our 
national period, the problem has become increasingly severe in recent years. Currently, the United 
States Border Patrol apprehends about 1 million individuals per year who try to cross the border 
illegally. Around 970/0 of these apprehensions occur along the Mexican border. 
Table 2. Illegal Immigrants Apprehended 
Category 2001 2002 2003 
Total 1,387,486 1,062,270 1,046,422 
Border Patrol 
Southwest Sectors(CA, AZ, TX) 1,235,718 929,809 905,065 
All Other Sectors 30,496 25,501 26,492 
Investigations 121,272 106,960 114,865 
Source: compiled from Table 37, page 155, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics, 2003, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 2004 
Of the 1,046,422 individuals apprehended in fiscal year 2003, the vast majority (more than 
91 %) came from Mexico (956,963). The next largest group of illegal immigrants came from Central 
America (40,687), after which came Asia (17,086), South America (10,479), the Caribbean (9,459), 
Africa (4,707), Europe (3,420), Canada (3,280), and Oceania (331 )?6 
Due to the nature of illegal immigration, only approximate figures are available for those 
individuals who successfully enter the United States. Generally accepted estimates place the number 
26 Table 36, page 154, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2003, 
U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 2004 
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of illegal immigrants at about 500,000 individuals per year. A report by the U.S. hnmigration and 
Naturalization Service indicates that the states with the largest numbers of illegal immigrants are 
California, Texas, New York, Illinois, and Florida. The official INS estimate for the number of illegal 
aliens living in the United States in 2000 was 7 million.27 
Costs and Benefits 
Illegal immigration imposes costs on society and on the immigrants themselves. The costs to 
society due to illegal immigration include the costs of border enforcement, deportation, law 
enforcement, crime, drugs, incarceration, education, health care, other social services, and remittances 
from the illegal immigrants to their home countries. The costs to the immigrants themselves include 
the costs of transportation to and across the border, documents, and non-pecuniary costs. These 
non-pecuniary costs include stress or death while attempting an illegal border crossing, and stress 
caused by living and working illegally in the United States. The benefits to the immigrants include 
higher incomes and access to social services, and for many illegal immigrants, benefits include 
automatic U.S. citizenship for children born in the United States. Benefits to society brought about by 
illegal immigration include a larger labor supply and taxes paid by the illegal immigrants. 
Tables 3 and 4 outline some of the more easily calculated costs and benefits to society of illegal 
aliens living in the United States. The information given in Table 3 is for three border states, but it is 
also representative of the cost burden placed on all U.S. taxpayers by illegal immigrants. For Arizona, 
California, and Texas, outlays for education, medical care, and incarceration of illegal aliens totaled 
$16.5 billion in 2004. Receipts from illegal aliens, in the form of taxes, totaled almost $3 billion, 
leaving a $13.6 billion cost to be absorbed by society. 
Table 3. Costs and Benefits of Illegal Immigrants in Billions of Dollars - 2004 
Category Outlays Receipts Net Cost 
California 
Education 
Illegal Aliens 3.2 3.2 
Children of Illegal Aliens 4.5 4.5 
Uncompensated Medical Care 1.4 1.4 
Incarceration 1.4 1.4 
Tax Payments 1.7 (1.7) 
Total 10.5 1.7 8.8 
Arizona 
27 Office of Policy and Planning, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Estimates of the Unauthorized 
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4.70 0.97 3.73 
16.49 2.927 13.563 
Source: compiled from three reports by the Federation for American Immigration Reform: The Costs 
of Illegal Immigration to Californians (6 Dec. 2004), The Costs of Illegal Immigration to Arizonan (3 
June 2004), and The Costs of Illegal Immigration to Texans (6 April 2005). 
Education, medical care, and incarceration of illegal aliens are some of the most easily 
recognizable costs to society. Remittances from illegal immigrants also represent a concrete cost to 
society in the United States. A remittance can simply be viewed as a monetary gift from an individual 
inside the United States to an individual outside of the United States. Remittances represent a loss to 
society because they are purchasing power that is removed from the economy. In 2004, remittances 
from the United States to Latin America totaled $30 billion dollars. Not all remittances from the 
United States to Latin America come from illegal immigrants, however. A study done by the Banco 
de Mexico gives a better picture of the costs of illegal immigration to the United States. In the first 
three quarters of 2004, $13.8 billion was sent to Mexico as remittances. Of that $13.8 Billion, 83 
percent came from Mexicans living as illegal immigrants outside of Mexico. While these figures 
provide only a rough idea of the cost to the U.S. economy of remittances from illegal aliens, they 
represent a very real cost, one that could easily total $15 billion per year. 
Table 4. Remittances from the United States - 2004 
Total to Latin America ................................................. $30 Billion 
To Mexico..................................................... $17 Billion (of which 83% came from illegal 
aliens) 
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Source: Remittances from the US to Latin America, 2004, Inter-American Development Bank 
http://\vww.iadb.org/exr/rennttances/ranking.cfin 
Banco de Mexico Study, quoted in Illegal Mexican Immigrants Send the Most Money Home 
By Marcela Cortes, EFE News Service, Dateline Orlando, Florida, December 17,2004 
The operating budget for the United States Border control can also be seen as a cost to society 
of illegal immigration. In order to enforce current immigration law and protect the borders of the 
United States, the U.S. Border Patrol requires a yearly budget of $1.4 billion?8 
The costs of illegal immigration to the immigrants themselves are less easily calculated than 
the previously mentioned figures, as records are not typically kept for illegal activities. However, 
estimates of the typical fee per person paid to a smuggler for passage over the border are generally 
around $2000 for Mexicans. Other immigrants, like Europeans and Asians, are known to pay far more, 
from many thousands to many tens of thousands of dollars?9 Other less-easily quantifiable costs to the 
illegal immigrants include the cost of documents (e.g. Mexican visas for non-Mexicans) and the cost 
of transportation to the border. Non-pecuniary costs include physical hardship experienced during a 
border crossing and the stress of living and working in a country illegally, which comes from insecurity 
and the risk of being punished or deported. 
Table 5. Various Costs 
Typical fee per person to smuggler (coyote) ...... ........ . . $2,000 
Border Patrol Operating Budget. ........... ..... ... .............. . $1.4 Billion per year 
The benefits to society of illegal immigration include taxes paid by the immigrants and a larger 
workforce. The illegal immigrants are often benefited by an increased ability to find remunerative 
employment, receive an education for themselves and their children, and by automatic U.S. citizenship 
for their U.S.-born children. The benefits to the immigrants are also reflected in their earnings and the 
amount of money they are able to send back home. 
Interestingly, the average amount of money remitted to Latin American countries per 
immigrant per year is $1,805, slightly less than the typical $2000 paid to a smuggler for entry into the 
United States. 30 
IV. A Market for Immigration 
Economic Efficiency 
28 U.S. Customs and Border Patrol website 
29 Mary Jordan, People Smuggling Now Big Business in Mexico, Washington Post Foreign Service, 17 May 
2001. 
30 Remittances from the US to Latin America, 2004, Inter-American Development Bank 
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Competitive market resource allocation is efficient and bureaucratic resource allocation is 
inefficient. Hence, a secondary market for immigration permits would increase efficiency of resource 
allocation by allowing the permits to move to their highest economic use. Greater efficiency of 
resource allocation increases economic well-being in society, as measured by total surplus. In addition, 
it is well known that legalization of any economic activity reduces the price of the previously illegal 
good or service involved, by increasing the supply and by eliminating the risk component in the price. 
There are many real-world examples of efficient secondary markets, such as legal ticket 
scalping. Legal ticket scalping has long been recognized as an activity that improves resource 
allocation by allowing scarce tickets to be purchased by those willing to pay the most. Individuals who 
place a high value on their time may not be willing to stand in line to purchase a ticket, but would be 
willing to pay a price for the ticket higher than the face value. Other individuals who place a relatively 
low value on their time may be willing to stand in line if they can sell the ticket they purchase at a profit. 
If society allows the tickets to be resold in a secondary market, both the buyer and the seller in this 
market, hence, society as a whole, will be better-off. 
Another example of the effective application of a secondary market is the case of pollution 
permits. Competitive markets do not allocate society'S resources efficiently if there are "externalities," 
or spillover effects connected with the production or consumption of a good or service. This is so 
because the market considers only private, i.e., internal, costs and benefits. External costs or benefits 
are ignored by the market even though they affect society. Because air pollution caused by, say, a steel 
mill is a cost to society, but not a private cost to the producers or consumers of steel, the market will 
not take it into account and the production of steel will be too large for economic efficiency. One way 
of achieving economic efficiency where pollution exists is to internalize the cost of pollution by taxing 
it at a rate equal to the external cost of the pollution. The producers of steel then have a choice: 
eliminate the pollution or pay the tax. Rational producers will eliminate pollution to the point that the 
marginal cost of eliminating pollution is equal to the tax-the marginal cost of polluting. Since the tax 
has been set to equal the marginal benefit to society of eliminating pollution, the market will now 
produce the efficient amount of steel (and will eliminate the efficient amount of pollution). While a 
tax is an efficient method of dealing with the negative externality of air pollution, it doesn't take into 
account the fact that eliminating pollution is more expensive for some producers than for others. A 
secondary market for pollution permits has proven to be an even more efficient method than taxation 
as a way of dealing with the negative externality of air pollution. In this method, the amount of 
pollution to be permitted in a region (the efficient amount) is allocated to producers by permit, with the 
understanding that the pollution permits may be bought and sold. By allowing the permits to be 
purchased by those willing to pay the most, society guarantees that pollution will be eliminated in the 
most cost-effective way, and that the optimal amount of pollution to allow in society will be lower than 
under a strict taxation system. The economic efficiency achieved by the use of secondary markets in 
these examples would also be achieved by a secondary market for immigration permits. 
A Secondary Market for Immigration Permits 
Because U.S. immigration law sets quotas for immigration each year, and because the demand 
for admission into the United States exceeds the supply (quota), a chronic shortage of legal admission 
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exists. This shortage leads to an illegal market-a black market of sorts-for immigration, and to all of 
the problems of illegal immigration identified above. If a legal secondary market for immigration 
permits were to be established, it would eliminate the shortage in the market by establishing a 
market-clearing price for legal immigration into the U.S. Eliminating the shortage of legal 
immigration permits would deal a devastating blow to the market for illegal immigration. Because 
rational potential immigrants would be willing to pay only a fraction of the legal price for illegal entry 
(because of the risk and other non-pecuniary costs associated with being illegal), the supply of illegal 
entry opportunities would be significantly reduced as smugglers and "coyotes" found that their services 
had become much less remunerative. This reduction in illegal immigration would lead to a 
concomitant reduction in costs to U.S. taxpayers, a higher standard of living, and a more secure society. 
An immigration system in which qualified individuals who have received immigration permits are 
allowed to sell these permits in a secondary market to other qualified individuals would improve the 
economic well-being of both the buyer and the seller, and would ensure that those who legally 
immigrate to the United States are those who most highly value the immigration opportunity. 
Secondary Market Rules 
This type of a market for immigration would be applicable to all individuals involved in legal 
immigration except for refugees and asylees. As per current immigration law, the total number of 
permanent visas potentially involved in this market is the sum of all family-sponsored visas (approx. 
575,000/year), employment-based visas (approx. 140,000/year), and diversity lottery visas 
(50,000/year), or around 765,000 visas per year. 
In addition to these permanent visas, all of the ~ 150,000 temporary work visas per year could 
be included in this secondary market. 
Only 5,000 of the employment-based visas are given to workers without high skills, and 66,000 
of the temporary visas go to seasonal or temporary workers. A market for these 71 ,000 visas would 
have the most direct impact on illegal immigration. 
Likely Effects of a Market for Immigration 
A market for immigration, as outlined above could have a significant, positive impact on the 
economy and society of the United States. Likely effects of such a market include: 
1 Higher average level of human capital of legal immigrants, leading to increases in 
average and marginal product of labor, reflected in higher incomes and a higher 
standard of living for U.S. citizens. 
2. Greatly reduced level of illegal immigration and associated social costs, leading to a 
higher standard of living for U.S. citizens. (In this area alone, the current costs of illegal 
immigration to citizens of California, Arizona, and Texas average about $1,000 per 
legal family.) 
3. Greater efficiency of resource allocation, hence, an additional contribution to a higher 
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standard of living for U.S. citizens. 
4. More secure borders. 
V. The Model 
The impact of a market for immigration on the decision to immigrate illegally can be more 
formally specified using a standard migration model: 
T 
(1) PDV = L (Bnt - Bot)/(l +rY - C, 
t=1 
where PDV = present discounted value of migration 
Bnt = expected utility derived from new job in year t 
Bot = expected utility derived from old job in year t 
r = subjective rate of time preference 
C = expected utility lost in the move itself 
T = length of time (in years) one expects to work in job n 
In this model, an individual will migrate ifPDV is positive, hence the probability of migration 
is directly related to Bnt and T, and is inversely related to BOb r, and C. We can compare the likelihood 
of a given potential immigrant entering the U.S. legally or illegally by looking at the differences in Bnb 
C, and T for legal and illegal entry. The expected utility derived from the new job in a given year (Bnt) 
would likely be higher for legal immigrants than for illegal immigrants for at least two reasons. First, 
employers of legal immigrants cannot easily pay their workers wages less than the minimum wage or 
the competitive wage, if higher than the minimum wage. In addition, legal immigrants will have 
legitimate social security numbers and their employers will almost surely make the required social 
security contributions for their workers. Hence, legal immigrants can expect to earn a higher wage 
than illegal immigrants, and will more likely receive social security retirement benefits, both of which 
would result greater expected utility from working in the United States. Second, legal immigrants do 
not need to worry about deportation. The elimination of this stress factor would undoubtedly increase 
the expected utility derived from work for legal workers. 
If a potential immigrant can purchase a legal entry permit into the United States, the cost of the 
move, in terms of lost utility (C), would be greatly reduced relative to the fmancial, emotional, and 
physical costs of entering the United States illegally. Also, because of the possibility of detection and 
deportation, the length of time an illegal immigrant would expect to work in a new job in the U.S. (T) 
would be shorter than that expected by a legal immigrant, ceteris paribus. For all three reasons, 
then-greater expected utility from the new job, small expected utility loss from the move, and longer 
time horizon-if legal entry into the United States is an option for potential immigrants, that option 
would most likely be chosen. In fact, the larger value of legal immigration vis-a-vis illegal 
immigration would induce potential immigrants to pay a premium for the right to immigrate legally. 
The lower demand for illegal entry would reduce the reward for immigrant smuggling, as well, 
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resulting in fewer smugglers and even greater risk-and lower likelihood-of illegal entry. 
An interesting aspect of the immigration model is the role of the subjective rate of time 
preference, r. For given values of the other variables in the model, the lower the rate of time preference, 
the greater the reward for immigration. The implication of this characteristic of the model is that, other 
things being equal, those most likely to immigrate (legally or illegally) are those with the lowest 
subjective rate of time preference. For the economy as a whole, lower rate of time preference-greater 
willingness to wait for gratification-is a positive factor for economic growth, since individuals with 
lower rates of time preference are more likely to save, and saving is necessary to finance the 
investment in real and human capital that drives economic growth. This self-selection on the basis of 
time preference is an important, but often-overlooked aspect of immigration that has a positive impact 
on the economic well-being of society, ceteris paribus. 
IV. Conclusions 
The illegal market for immigration that exists because of excess demand for the limited 
number of legal admissions into the United has led to significant costs imposed on U.S. society. The 
strain on states' social services budgets and on their legal systems, the increased crime rates, and the 
perceived danger to national security because of unsecured borders has made illegal immigration one 
of the most important political issues in the United States. A legal secondary market for immigration 
permits would eliminate the shortage in the market by establishing a market-clearing price for legal 
immigration into the U.S. and would greatly reduce the market for illegal immigration. This reduction 
in illegal immigration would lead to a concomitant reduction in costs to U.S. taxpayers, a higher 
standard of living, and a more secure society. An immigration system in which qualified individuals 
who have received immigration permits are allowed to sell these permits in a secondary market to 
other qualified individuals would improve the economic well-being of both the buyer and the seller, 
and would ensure that those who legally immigrate to the United States are those who most highly 
value the immigration opportunity. 
-16-
I . 
